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Introduction
Poor compliance is one of the key factors 
behind persistently low tax-to-GDP ratios 
in developing countries. Two dimensions 
of non-compliance that have been widely 
studied are under-reporting and non-filing 
(i.e. failing to submit a tax declaration 
altogether). However, there is a third 
and largely under-researched dimension 
of non-compliance: nil-filing. It refers to 
taxpayers who are registered and submit 
a tax declaration, but report essentially no 
information to the revenue authority (i.e. 
they report zero in all fields) and, as a result, 
generate no tax revenue. This behaviour is 
widespread in Rwanda: it concerned over 
half of all corporate income tax (CIT) returns 
and a quarter of personal income tax (PIT) 
returns in 2017. Despite being a well-known 
problem among tax administrators, there 
is no literature examining the cause of this 
apparently puzzling behaviour. If these 
businesses intend to evade taxation, then 
why register for taxes at all? Alternatively, 
if these businesses truly do not make any 
income, why do they continue to exist?
This paper uses a mix of descriptive analysis 
of administrative data, a randomised control 
trial (RCT), and qualitative information 
collected through interviews with tax 
officials and taxpayers to shed light on 
the reasons behind this phenomenon. We 
argue that evasion is not a major part of 
the explanation for nil-filing. Rather, this 
behaviour appears to be driven by the 
interaction between aggressive taxpayer 
recruitment campaigns by the Rwanda 
Revenue Authority (RRA) and taxpayers’ 
responses to complexities in the tax system. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study to document nil-filing behaviour 
in detail and to test the reasons behind it.
Data and methodology
This study uses two main data sources: 
administrative data from CIT and PIT returns 
between 2013 and 2017, allowing the authors 
to observe actual compliance behaviour at 
the taxpayer level; and interviews with a 
random sample of 30 nil-filers and 24 RRA 
officials. The authors also conducted an RCT 
aiming to nudge taxpayers with messages 
specific to nil-filers and test two hypotheses: 
that nil-filers are evaders; and that nil-filers 
should in fact deregister but fail to do so. The 
treatment involved sending three versions of 
an SMS message from RRA to comparable 
groups of nil-filers: a reminder, a deterrence 
message, and a deregistration message. 
The treatment effects were compared with a 
control group which received no message.
Anatomy of active ghosts
The analysis of administrative data showed 
that nil-filing is a common practice: the 
five-year average rate of nil returns over the 
total number of returns lodged is 53% and 
17% respectively for CIT and PIT. Further, 
nil-filing is common in the life of a taxpayer, 
especially for corporations, with 70% of CIT 
and 18% of PIT taxpayers filing nil at least 
once in the period examined. Importantly, 
two thirds of CIT payers who nil-file at least 
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once are “perpetual” nil-filers, who nil every 
time they file during the study period. We 
also observe a sharp increase in nil-filing 
around 2014, which corresponds with a 
drive by the RRA to register new taxpayers, 
without much consideration for whether 
businesses had actually begun operations. 
Considering several relevant taxpayer 
characteristics, the authors find that the 
typical nil-filer is a small, relatively young 
business, based in Kigali, with a consistent 
habit of filing late. Nil-filing is also more 
prevalent in the construction and energy 
and mining sectors.
Key findings
The RCT found that receiving any treatment 
significantly reduces the probability to 
file nil by 2.2 percentage points, with the 
reminder being the most effective nudge. 
As expected, the deregistration message 
led to a 1 percentage point increase in 
deregistrations, implying a doubling relative 
to the average in the control group. While 
these treatments were effective in statistical 
terms, the magnitude of the impact was 
quite small. Importantly, the great majority 
of the sample, approximately 85%, did 
not react to the nudge at all, continuing to 
nil-file. These results suggest that, while 
evasion and the need to deregister play a 
role in the decision to nil-file, they do not 
represent a conclusive explanation.
The qualitative interviews offered a more 
comprehensive picture, finding that 
taxpayers are well-aware of their nil-filing 
behaviour and persisted with it as a way 
to cope with confusing administrative 
practices and rules. The majority of 
nil-filers interviewed reported that they had 
registered a business that in fact never 
operated. This may be related to a rather 
aggressive taxpayer recruitment strategy 
recently pursued by RRA. Mass registration 
campaigns are likely to bring new taxpayers 
into the tax system before they have 
begun any income-generating activity. 
Being registered in such a circumstance is 
likely to generate significant confusion for 
new taxpayers, which is aggravated by a 
lack of guidance from RRA on what new 
taxpayers should do next. In addition, RRA 
actively encourages registered taxpayers 
to file declarations, even if they have 
nothing to declare. When combined with a 
reluctance to deregister (due to a mixture of 
administrative complexities and a fear that 
deregistration would trigger an audit), this 
has unintentionally created a large pool of 
nil-filers. 
A further explanatory factor is that 
taxpayers are generally not well-acquainted 
with the tax system and their obligations. 
This confusion is compounded when 
administrative practices are unclear, and 
sometimes even inconsistent with the law. 
As a result, taxpayers adopt nil-filing as a 
mechanism to be compliant with practical 
(though not legal) requirements to file, 
although they cannot afford the compliance 
cost of filing an accurate declaration, 
especially since they would pay little to 
no tax anyway. Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that nil-filing is employed as a 
strategy to avoid late filing and non-filing 
penalties.
Policy recommendations
The reasons for nil-filing are intricate and 
there are substantial obstacles to change. 
However, our analysis allows us to draw 
four policy recommendations:
• Reduce confusion by enhancing 
communication with taxpayers at the 
point of registration, as well as ensuring 
that only taxpayers who effectively need 
to register are urged to do so.
• Review the usefulness and necessity of 
the practical rules of tax administration 
which are not prescribed in the law.
• Simplify procedures as much as possible 
throughout tax administration and 
ensure that simplified procedures are 
communicated to taxpayers so that they 
can take them up.
• Target a small portion of nil-filers with 
checks to close any evasion gap and lend 
credibility to messages of deterrence. 
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